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Non-affiliation in armed conflicts is as old as war itself. Traditionally, 
neutrality has been thought of as constituting a system through which non-
belligerent states could remain at peace with warring states, and thereby 
avoid attack, while continuing peacetime trading relations.1 However, such a 
traditional neutrality did not suffice during the horrors of the first modern 
and industrial war fought to the limits of the endurance of the participants 
(guerre à outrance). During the First World War, entire nations threw the 
totality of their capacity of natural and human resources into the fray in a 
battle which was widely believed to shape the future of the world for 
decades, even centuries, to come. Both competing power blocs in this Great 
War, the Entente and the Central Powers, displayed a blatant disregard for 
international rules and regulations concerning neutral trade.2 The Germans 
waged a submarine war against her principal enemy, Britain, threatening any 
vessel supplying her with destruction. Their ‘subsurface blockade’ retaliated 
against Entente measures to block their ports and stop them from 
importing essential supplies from overseas, such as foodstuffs and raw 
materials. In such a war, where competition extended from the battlefield to 
the ‘home front’ of industry and commerce, neutrals could not be left 
unmolested if their ‘peacetime trade relations’ were felt to benefit the 
enemy. 
The neutral Netherlands were placed squarely, and uncomfortably, in 
the no-mans-land of Anglo-German economical warfare. To survive this 
highly destructive global conflict intact, the Netherlands needed to convince 
both sides that their neutrality benefited them to a greater degree than their 
belligerence would. Thus developed a system historians nowadays refer to 
as ‘symmetrical neutrality’: instead of steadfastly maintaining a policy of 
strict non-interference, the Netherlands gave in to demands from both sides 
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in equal measure, walking a tight rope between neutrality and the accusation 
of favouring either side’s enemy.3  
 Within the framework of this ‘symmetrical’ neutrality, the Netherlands 
Overseas Trust Company (Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij or 
N.O.T.) played a pivotal, if historically underappreciated, role. This article 
will deal with its inception and detail its role in keeping the Netherlands 
unaffiliated, although no longer strictly neutral. 
The creation of the N.O.T. is closely connected with the 
development of the Entente blockade, whose history is vital to the 
understanding of Dutch neutrality. Although Entente strategists were aware 
of the fact that the German Empire imported as much as twenty per cent of 
her raw materials from overseas, no blockading campaign4 of any kind had 
been discussed by its main instigator, the British in the years leading up to 
the Great War. Their scenarios for a major European war, from 1904/1905 
on, featured France and Germany as the main protagonists. In this case 
Britain planned either for armed neutrality or for an alliance with France in 
a limited war with limited objectives: the Navy would hunt down and 
destroy the nascent German Hochseeflotte, and a small detachment of British 
Territorials would take their place on the right flank of the French army, 
which, after repelling the German invasion of France, would, aided by the 
Russians, happily march on Berlin to dictate terms. Although the Army, the 
Navy and the Government frequently did not see eye to eye on the subject 
of strategic preparation in case of a conflict with Germany5, they did agree 
that in such an event their enemy would not be blockaded. Even though 
some saw strategic advantages, it was also noted that the Low Countries 
would remain neutral and would have to be blockaded (and thus treated as 
virtual belligerents) as well in order to effectively starve the Germans. 
Moreover, the Americans too would most likely be neutral, and were 
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historically rather picky when it came to any infringement as to what they 
perceived as their neutral rights. Those in control of the government and 
the armed forces agreed that the disadvantages such side effects may have 
outstripped any advantages that might be gained from such action. There 
was also a general concern that, during an Anglo-German war, the 
Hochseeflotte might be in a position to jeopardize the British influx of raw 
materials. A press campaign detailing the havoc German submarines would 
reek on defenceless commercial carriers bringing much-needed grain into 
Britain, did much to mobilize both the general populace and the 
government in favour of the notion that a blockade was something that 
could only hurt the Empire in wartime. Finally, the last time the British had 
used a blockade as an offensive weapon (during the First Boer War), 
international fall-out had been so heavy they had decided to stop their 
blockading measures after a mere month.6 
 In 1907, Britain had the unique opportunity to elevate her desire to 
see her commerce protected elevated to the status of international law. In 
that year, the Great Powers convened at the second of the great peace 
conferences at The Hague.7 The wanton destruction of neutral commerce 
by the Russian navy during the recent Russo-Japanese war had assured that 
the safety of commercial fleets during wartime was to have a prominent 
place during the deliberations. International law on the matter (expounded 
in the 1856 Declaration of Paris) stated that ‘free’ (neutral) ships during 
wartime carried ‘free’ goods, i.e. that the neutral flag would cover any goods 
on board and makes them impervious to capture, in stark contrast to goods 
carried on enemy ships. The exception to this rule was the shipment of so-
called contraband: goods which could be captured, even on neutral ships, if 
they were shown to be bound for the enemy and would in his service be 
used for military purposes. The Russians had argued, however, that due to 
the changing nature of modern warfare, it was almost impossible to 
determine which goods could possibly have a military purpose, and had 
thus decided to declare any type of goods she did not want to reach their 
Japanese enemies as contraband, liable to capture or destruction. To 
prevent such a wanton use of the concept of contraband, the Powers 
decided to define contraband as precisely as possible. Following a proposal 
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by the French diplomat Louis Renault, three categories of contraband were 
created. The first of these, the absolute contraband, would contain goods 
which would aid a belligerent directly in waging war, and would always be 
liable to capture by that belligerent’s enemy. The second category, conditional 
contraband, was liable to capture if a belligerent could prove that the goods in 
question had a military, rather than a civilian use. The last consisted of ‘free’ 
goods, which would never be liable to capture.8 
 A further issue relating to trade between neutral countries needed 
solving. During the Russo-Japanese War as well as during the British 
blockade of the First Boer War, the doctrine of continuous voyage (based on an 
ancient legal precedent) was invoked to show that contraband, even though 
travelling on a neutral ship and between neutral ports, ultimately had an 
enemy destination, and were therefore liable to capture. Evidence that such 
cargoes were indeed to be transported from their neutral de-embarking 
point to an enemy destination was, naturally, hard to come by. However, 
when the delegates moved to abrogate the doctrine, the American 
delegation objected, guided by their perception that the doctrine had played 
a major role in the Union’s victory during the Civil War. Finally, on 26 
February 1907, a compromise was reached in which the doctrine would be 
maintained for absolute, but not for conditional contraband, and the new 
international naval agreement as to belligerent rights at sea was signed, 
dubbed the Declaration of London after the British capital where the 
follow-up conference to the Hague proceedings was held.9 
 The contracted parties committed themselves thereafter to adapt 
their legislation to match the new international naval code of conduct. In 
the British case, however, this was much easier said then done. Political 
strife ensued, focussing mostly on Article 34 of the Declaration, which 
stated that goods considered conditional contraband were liable to be 
captured if they were: 
 
[…] consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in 
the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies 
articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the 
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goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or 
other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy.10 
 
This provision caused a storm in British domestic politics. If, in wartime, 
food was shipped to a British harbour city, which was, quite naturally, 
defended, could an enemy belligerent not reasonably state, several MP’s 
claimed, that this food, although meant for the civilian population of such a 
city, was in fact meant for ‘a fortified place’, and thus liable to capture? 
Furthermore, would a city housing a garrison of soldiers similarly be denied 
food? The oppositional Conservatives decided to exploit these points for 
electoral gain, portraying the Liberal government as one which willingly 
risked British food supply in time of war. Nevertheless, the House of 
Commons voted along party lines, after which the proposed legislation was 
moved to the House of Lords. The Lords, however, following the 
Conservative argument, opposed the bill. Other contracting parties to the 
London Declaration therefore decided to forego changing their prize laws.11 
However, naval authorities in most major contracting nations, such as 
Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and the United States, 
nevertheless decided to update their own naval prize manuals12 to 
incorporate the rules and regulations of the Declaration. 
 Just before the outbreak of the Great War, the chances of Britain 
blockading Germany appeared slim. Although politically she was not bound 
by the Declaration, the Liberals did support it (being closely associated with 
the eventual compromise made in The Hague and London), and actively 
tried to push it through Parliament again (even as late as June 1914). Most 
military planners held a blockade of their enemy to be either useless or 
politically highly dangerous. The Admiralty focussed its efforts on the 
Hochseeflotte and its war plans (as of 1913) called for a great naval 
confrontation and the destruction of all enemy shipping. As to contraband, 
the Declaration of London was to guide their actions. However, all this was 
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Stretching the Declaration of London, August 1914 
 
Upon Germany’s violation of neutral Belgium on 3 August 1914, the British 
government allied herself with the enemies of the Central Powers. 
Preparations were made to despatch an Expeditionary Force to France in 
order to halt the German advance and the Navy was ordered to deploy 
according to her war plans.13 
 As we have seen previously, it remained somewhat of an open 
question which belligerent rights at sea the British would assume during 
wartime. However, both the Admiralty and the Government stuck by the 
Declaration of London, and the Order in Council of 4 August, issued to 
clarify Britain’s position on the matter, adhered to the Declaration as well 
(without ever naming it), and instructed the fleet to concentrate on enemy, 
not neutral shipping.14 
 Since the German Hochseeflotte dared not challenge the Entente’s 
control of the North Sea directly, German and Austro-Hungarian merchant 
shipping became an easy target for the Entente fleets. When war broke out, 
more than half of the combined Central Powers merchant marine hid in 
neutral or friendly ports. By the end of summer the remaining ships were 
also forced to hide, or were captured or sunk by Entente ships. Within the 
space of a few weeks, the combined Central Powers merchant marines, 
accounting for roughly fourteen per cent of the world’s total shipping 
tonnage, had disappeared from the High Seas.15 
 These measures were perceived as severely affecting Germany’s 
ability to fight. Papers ran wild with stories of German soldiers surrendering 
out of a lack of food. However, at the same time it was noted that 
shipments to neutral countries, amongst which the Netherlands were 
explicitly mentioned, had significantly increased. Many of these imports 
found their way into Germany, thereby alleviating the allegedly near-fatal 
food situation. Since these imports were carried on neutral ships to neutral 
ports, there was nothing the British fleet, operating under the strictures of 
the Declaration, could do about them. 
 Flushed with the sense that German food shortages might prove a 
decisive factor in an early victory over the Central Powers, the Cabinet 
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sought to halt these imports. Several prominent cabinet members, First 
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
David Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, amongst 
them, began to argue for the application of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage to food shipments consigned to neutrals, especially to Rotterdam. 
This would entail setting aside the Declaration of London, which was 
considerably easier said than done. For one, Britain was a signatory Power 
to the treaty, even if she had not ratified it. Secondly, the British had 
declared loudly to be fighting Germany for the rights of small nations, 
which made infringing on Holland’s rights somewhat difficult. Thirdly, the 
United States had inquired, on 6 August, whether the belligerents would 
publicly acknowledge the continued validity of the Declaration. Germany 
replied first, stating that she would indeed do so if her opponents did the 
same. If Britain declared that she would not, this might seriously harm her 
relationship with the US.16 
 Despite these valid objections, Grey set his Foreign Office to work 
on a draft Order in Council, which would expand the belligerent rights 
Britain would assume for herself at sea. Although this draft went a long way 
towards meeting the provision of the Declaration of London, the phrase 
stating that the British government would ‘abide by and carry out’ said 
Declaration (as did the August 4 Order in Council) was crossed out and 
substituted with the statement that Britain would ‘act in accordance with’ 
the London naval code. The draft also made an important alteration as to 
contraband, stating that, in future, the military application of conditional 
contraband ‘may be inferred from any sufficient evidence and shall be 
presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the 
Enemy State or to or for a merchant or other person under the control of 
the authorities of the Enemy State’.17 
 These provisions would enable the Royal Navy to intercept and bring 
in suspicious cargo even if the papers did not consistently prove it was 
destined for the enemy. Without their implementation, it would be virtually 
impossible to stop neutral ships destined for a neutral port, from where its 
cargo could travel on to enemy territory.  
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 In addition to the above-mentioned reports on the German food 
situation, domestic considerations played their part in the Foreign Office’s 
new-found willingness to modify the Declaration of London, as shown by a 
memorandum written by Cecil Hurst of the Foreign Office Legal 
Department. In his opinion, a statement of Britain’s proposed adherence to 
the declaration was impossible, partly because the current naval prize 
manual had not been updated, but also because ‘the Opposition adopted a 
very hostile attitude to the Declaration of London during the debates on the 
Naval Prize Bill three years ago’. The Foreign Office was not very keen to 
revive the bitter row over the Naval Prize Bill which had humiliated the 
Government before the war at a time when unity was the order of the day.18  
 However, the question remained as to how the British government 
could change the terms of the Declaration and get away with it. McKenna, 
the Home Secretary and Churchill’s predecessor as First Lord of the 
Admiralty, offered a way out. He presented his Cabinet colleagues with 
Admiralty reports, (falsely) stating that the German government had taken 
control of all of Germany’s food supplies. According to the Declaration of 
London, any goods destined for a ‘government department of the enemy 
State’ could be considered conditional contraband. This in itself would not 
make any difference, since under the Declaration neutral ships travelling to 
neutral ports could not be stopped. However, although the British navy 
operated under these constrictions, it did not have to. Since the Naval Prize 
Bill had not been reintroduced to Parliament when hostilities commenced, 
the old Prize Law, defined for blockading the Boers in 1900, was technically 
still valid. This Prize Law contained provisions for the capture of 
contraband, anywhere on its journey and irrespective of the status of the 
ship upon which it was found, if it could be proven that it was intended for 
an enemy agency. By using the Declaration to show that contraband 
shipped to Germany was bound for an enemy agency, and using British 
prize law to authorize capture of foodstuffs with hostile destination, 
McKenna managed to wrap a legal argument around the capture of 
German-bound foodstuffs.19 The Cabinet agreed, amended the draft using 
McKenna’s legal argumentation, and issued the Order in Council on 20 
August. 
 No doubt, these British measures were sure to have a definitive 
impact on neutral trade, not least of which that of the Dutch. Even before 
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the Order in Council had been approved by the Cabinet, Churchill had 
already stressed the danger that Rotterdam, one of the principal neutral 
ports, would ‘effectively [become] a base for the enemy’s supplies’.20 On 27 
August, the Cabinet ordered the Royal Navy explicitly to check thoroughly 




Government, Commerce, and the Dutch ‘Balancing Act’ 
 
The Dutch government, forewarned by the fact that the navy had already 
begun stopping neutral ships carrying grain into Holland before the Order 
in Council was actually proclaimed22, took, as of 18 August, drastic action. 
Fearing a complete cessation of grain imports, she informed London that all 
grain imports would be requisitioned and that, in the future, merchants 
could consign their grain directly to the Dutch government, which would 
guarantee it would not be re-exported.23 
 However, this Dutch action was a direct violation of the so-called 
Rhine Shipping Act, which decreed the Rhine a ‘free’ river, meaning that no 
party could hinder the flow of traffic. Fearfull of German reprisals, the 
Dutch envoy to Berlin, baron J.W.G. Gevers, drove to the Dutch border, 
and begged the government to reconsider their position. He feared that a 
Dutch treaty violation would entice the Germans to reverse their decision 
to invade only one of the Low Countries.24 
 Gevers’ fears were justified. Dutch neutrality and its benefits to 
Germany had played a vital part in German war plans from 1906 onwards. 
In that year, Helmuth von Moltke had scrapped the planned invasion of 
Holland in plans for war with France, stating that Dutch neutrality ‘allows 
us to have imports and supplies. She must be the windpipe (Luftröhre) that 
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enables us to breathe’.25 These sentiments were echoed by F. von Müller, 
German envoy in The Hague, who stated on 3 August that Germany would 
respect Dutch neutrality, if said neutrality would be a wohlwollende 
Neutralität.26 Needless to say, Holland’s restrictions on the export of grain 
were not entirely compatible with this ‘benevolent neutrality’. Moreover, 
since German prices for certain commodities, such as sugar, cheese and 
butter, had risen sharply since the outbreak of war, the Dutch government, 
fearing an exhaustion of the home supply of these goods, felt compelled to 
impose restriction on the export of these goods also. She explained to the 
Germans that these were emergency measures – an explanation the 
Germans, for the moment, chose to accept. However, it was quite clear that 
Germany would tolerate no further encroachments on the Rhine treaty.27 
 The day after the proclamation of the second Order in Council, the 
Dutch decided to take further action to secure imports through the North 
Sea. She appointed A.G. Kröller, director of the largest Dutch grain-trading 
company, W.M. Müller en Co., to buy grain on the London market on her 
behalf.28 However, at the same time, the Dutch Government let it be 
known, referring to the Rhine Shipping Act that it would be possible to 
transfer imported goods, excluding those whose export she forbade, 
anywhere off the river after they had entered Holland via the Rhine, except 
in cases of national emergency. 
 This measure, taken not to anger the Germans, instead provoked the 
British. With no way of knowing whether goods imported to the Dutch 
were meant for ‘home consumption’ or for transhipment to Germany, they 
informed the Dutch Government on 26 August, via their chef de mission in 
The Hague, Alan Johnstone, that they would treat all Dutch imports of 
contraband items as highly suspect and therefore liable to capture, unless 
merchants importing said goods carried proof of ‘home consumption’.29 
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Johnstone’s ominous message was echoed in an admiralty Order of the 
same date, urging British ships to stop all vessels laden with foodstuffs of 
which Germany was the suspected final destination.30 Four days later, the 
total amount of ships detained by the British since the start of hostilities 
reached 52. Most of these ships were eventually released, but the procedure 
to prove home consumption was time-consuming, and the delays in the 
delivery of vital supplies were a serious drag on Dutch industry.31 
 To make sure that food imports were kept going, the Dutch minister 
in London, M. de Marees van Swinderen, informed the British Government 
of the impending shortage of grain in the Netherlands, and asked her, on 21 
August, whether she would allow ships loaded with Kröller’s grain to pass 
by her fleet unmolested, provided the Dutch Government acted as 
consignee to the foodstuffs and guaranteed that the goods would not be re-
exported to Germany, but would be consumed in the Netherlands or 
another neutral country.32 The next day Grey told him that the British 
government would agree to his proposal, and was, in response, told by De 
Marees van Swinderen that the Dutch government would be  
 
…quite ready to give any kind of guarantees as regards cargoes 
intended bona fide for use in Holland; and, if we would let these 
things go through, he could tell me as his own personal opinion that, 
not only would the Dutch Government not object to our putting 
difficulties in the way of commerce and supplies destined for 
Germany, but they would even be glad if we would stop such 
cargoes and so prevent Holland form having occasion for trouble 
with Germany.33 
 
However, for the moment, the British Government had no such guarantees, 
except regarding grain. To investigate the amount of Dutch supplies that 
reached Germany, she sent Francis Oppenheimer to Holland as 
Commercial Attaché to the British legation. On 23 August, Oppenheimer 
contacted J.C.A. Everwijn, a high official within the Dutch ministry of 
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, inquiring into the statistical material 
available at the ministry to aid him in his mission. Everwijn, however, raised 
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wider issues of Dutch trade and the impact of recent British measures, and 
Oppenheimer walked away from their conversation with the distinct 
impression that the Dutch government would go ‘a long way’ in giving the 
British the guarantees of home consumption they wanted, in order to 
safeguard Dutch trade.34 
 The fact that two high-ranking Dutch government officials confided 
to the British that, contrary to the official policy of neutrality, the Dutch 
government might be willing to adhere to their demands as to trade with 
Germany is indicative of the dire straits the Netherlands were in at the end 
of August. Of course there was no actual starvation, but the future did not 
bode well unless something was done. The British showed no signs of 
willingness to abandon their newly-rediscovered taste for economic warfare, 
even after it became clear that the German troops the BEF (British 
Expeditionary Forces) engaged in Belgium and France were well fed. The 
public demanded loudly that the screws be tightened as reports that 
Germany received massive amounts of foodstuffs through the Netherlands 
flooded the British press.35 Moreover, the British had learned that certain 
German companies had set up ‘dummy corporations’ in neutral countries, 
which, while masquerading as indigenous, existed solely to transfer 
contraband goods to Germany. Furthermore, merchants from neutral 
countries themselves had resorted to smuggling to evade export laws, and 
Germany took advantage of that by sending agents across its borders to 
secure these highly sought-after products. Finally, both Britain’s major allies 
in the war, France and Russia, advocated more stringent measures vis à vis 
the neutrals.36 
 As August turned into September, slowly but surely Dutch overseas 
trade ground to a halt. Grain shipments were forthcoming but had not yet 
arrived: the first shipment of Kröller’s grain would not reach Rotterdam 
before the end of the month.37 To discuss the War and its potentially 
devastating consequences for the Netherlands, a group of Dutch merchants 
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gathered in The Hague in the beginning of September, hoping to advise 
both the government and fellow merchants in these troubled times. They 
had been assembled by Cornelis van Aalst, director of the influential Dutch 
Trading Company and confidant of the Dutch government, which he had 
greatly assisted in the monetary crises following the outbreak of war. Anton 
Kröller as well as Laurens op ten Noort, chairman of the board of directors 
of one of the largest Dutch shipping companies, Royal Dutch Packet Lines, 
and Joost van Vollenhoven, an parliamentarian widely regarded as an expert 
on matters of shipping and trade were present as well. The most pressing 
problem, concluded the foursome, was the lack of information merchant 
shipping had on the rules of conduct to be followed when trading with 
either of the belligerent blocs. Thus, they created a committee to serve as a 
central information-gathering body for shipping rules and regulations, 
which could enter into contact with both governments. The twofold goal of 
this commission was to comply with foreign shipping regulations without 
breaking Dutch law or impairing Dutch neutrality, and to root out 
merchants who did not do so. To further this end, Leiden University law 
professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven (no relation of Joost’s) was asked to sit 
in and advise on legal matters. Now five members strong, the Committee 
for Dutch Trade (Commissie voor de Nederlandsche Handel, C.N.H.) was 
officially established on 17 September 1914.38 Everwijn informed 
Oppenheimer of the founding of the committee on the 19th, and explained 
its aims to him.39 
 That same day, Grey sent a communiqué to the Dutch minister in 
London, in which he officially enquired whether the Dutch government 
would agree to guarantee home consumption of contraband imports. De 
Marees van Swinderen answered on the 27th, after consulting with the 
Dutch government. The official response was that Holland could not accept 
a ‘British version’ of the Declaration of London, fearful that in doing so she 
would condone further ‘modifications’. Moreover, Dutch neutrality (in both 
legal and practical senses) forbade Holland to prevent re-exportation of 
goods, especially when such re-exportation was in accordance with the 
Declaration of Paris and the Rhine Shipping Convention. However, the 
Dutch government was prepared to ‘acheter lui-même toutes les 
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marchandises expédies vers la Hollande dont il juge l'importation aux Pays-
Bas une nécessité’. For all other goods, private assurances would have to 
do.40 This was as far as the Dutch could go, Everwijn’s and De Marees van 
Swinderen’s private remarks notwithstanding. If she had indeed promised 
Britain to aid her in depriving Germany, retaliations were sure to follow. 
Moreover, if the Dutch acquiesced now, this would be tantamount to 
inviting the British to rewrite international law so as to ignore neutral rights.  
 While the Dutch minister prepared his reply to Grey, Francis 
Oppenheimer, at Everwijn’s council, asked the C.N.H. whether they would 
meet with him. Amongst a host of other trade-related matters, the 
conversation covered the dire straits in which Dutch merchants found 
themselves. The Committee members stated that they did not think the 
Dutch government would consent to a ‘home consumption’ guarantee for 
contraband goods unless she was forced. Lacking both a mandate and the 
means to do so, the C.N.H. refused to accept this responsibility itself. 
However, Oppenheimer reports that two possible solutions for the Dutch 
quagmire arose: either Dutch shipping companies could refuse to carry 
contraband goods into Holland unless they were proven to be for ‘home 
consumption’, or the British government could expand her contraband list 
with every type of goods she wished to prevent from reaching Germany, 
and prohibit their export to Holland unless the Dutch government herself 
could guarantee its destination. Everwijn, Oppenheimer stated, hinted that 
the latter might be the better solution.41 Johnstone, when forwarding 
Oppenheimers report on the C.N.H. meeting to Grey, also recommended 
extending the contraband lists.42 
 The British had taken a first step in this direction on 21 September, 
when they expanded their contraband lists with several raw materials. But 
perhaps the further appliance of pressure was not necessary. On 3 October, 
Oppenheimer received word from his contact Everwijn that the Dutch 
government might reconsider its stance on guaranteeing home 
consumption. Together, the two created a scheme by which shipping 
companies could receive a guarantee from the merchants as to the 
destination of their cargoes; the shipping companies were to give their 
guarantees to the Netherlands Government, which would in turn repeat the 
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guarantee to the British Government. This scheme would be similar in 
operation to the agreement the Netherlands government had made earlier 
with the Holland-America Line (HAL), in which the latter would only ship 
government-consigned grain.43 
 Subsequently, Oppenheimer left for London to attend a meeting, 
chaired by Grey, in which Sir Eyre Crowe, the under-secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Sir Cecil Hurst, legal adviser to the Foreign Office, and the 
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Walter Runciman, were also present. I 
have not been able to find the minutes of this meeting, save for an 
intriguing handwritten note, attached to Johnstone’s letter to Grey reporting 
Oppenheimer’s meeting with the C.N.H., saying that Oppenheimer was to 
be recalled to London to be briefed by Hurst. I theorize that his presence 
was required in connection with the drafting of a third Order in Council, 
and shall attempt to explain my line of reasoning in the following section. 
 
 
Holland, the United States and British policy, September-October 
1914 
 
One of the main reasons for issuing a third Order in Council to supplant 
the August 20 Order was the attitude of the United States. Britain had sent 
her a note, on 22 August, explaining how she, as requested by the US, had 
adopted the Declaration of London, save for a few ‘modifications’.44 
Realizing that British measures were sure to interrupt US trade with all the 
‘Northern Neutrals’ (Holland and Scandinavia), and aware of the immense 
importance of US imports to the Entente war effort, Britain nervously 
awaited the Americans’ response. 
 The task of drafting a reply fell to Robert Lansing, Counselor of the 
US State Department and an expert in international law. Unable to confer 
with either President Woodrow Wilson (who was, amongst other things, 
occupied with the death of his wife) or his Secretary of State William Bryan 
(who was out of the office campaigning for the 1914 Congressional 
elections), he set to work, finishing only on 26 September. The draft reply 
recounted the State Department’s attempts to have all belligerents accept 
the Declaration of London, accused the British of establishing a ‘paper 
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blockade’ (a blockade which did not conform to either the London or the 
Paris Declaration, since the British did not close off German ports directly 
as per the former, nor had they positioned their fleet within the rayon d’action 
prescribed in the latter Declaration (which stated that a blockade must not 
extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy). Moreover, the State Department accused Britain of disregarding 
neutral rights altogether in the matter of conditional contraband, and 
protested against the vagueness of the requirement to gather evidence of the 
ultimate destination of traded goods. The note closed with an ominous 
warning that the Americans had not forgotten the indignation of the 
British-US war of 1812, which the US fought and lost over their neutral 
rights (endangered by the British blockade of mainland Europe) in the 
Napoleonic War.45 
 Wilson, however, spurned by his trusty aide ‘Colonel’ Edward M. 
House, disagreed with the note’s severity, and told Lansing to delay sending 
it to London. House was sent to Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, British 
Ambassador in Washington, to gouge his reaction. Relieved that the note 
had not been sent, Spring-Rice recommended negotiations on the matter, 
and advised House to scrap the Lansing note. House and Wilson 
acquiesced, the latter instructing US Ambassador Walter Hines Page, on the 
28th, to confer with Grey in London: 
 
You will immediately see Sir Edward Grey and state to him 
informally and confidentially that this Government is greatly 
disturbed by the intention of the British Government to change the 
provisions of the Declaration of London by the Order in Council of 
the twentieth August and to adopt the Declaration thus changed as a 
code of naval warfare for the present war. […] You will impress 
upon Sir Edward Grey the President’s conviction of the extreme 
gravity of the situation and his earnest wish to avoid even causes of 
irritation and controversy between this Government and the 
Government of his Majesty.46 
 
                                                 
45 Daniel M. Smith, ‘Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutrality Policies, 
1914-1915’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43-1 (June 1956) 63-4 and Kendrick A. 
Clements, ‘Woodrow Wilson and World War I’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 34-1 (March 
2004) 67. 
46 Wilson to Page, cited in Arthur S. Link, Wilson. The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 
(Princeton 1960) 112. 




That same day, Lansing conferred with Spring-Rice, suggesting that the 
British could avoid much trouble with the Americans by getting neutral 
governments (specifically mentioning the Dutch) to prevent re-exportation 
of foodstuffs and other conditional contraband items by placing those on 
the absolute contraband list, and thus forcing them to enter into direct 
negotiations with the British. In order not to starve, they would give in. 
Thus, both the American exports to the neutrals and the British intent to 
deny the Germans key imports could be safeguarded at the same time. 
Spring-Rice agreed, and went on to advise his government to place articles 
used almost exclusively for the manufacture of arms, such as copper and 
petroleum, on the absolute contraband list. London took Spring-Rice’s 
advice to heart, and drafted a new Order in Council to this effect.47  
 Whatever its eventual form, it seemed clear that the list of 
contraband items would be dramatically extended. Public opinion in Britain 
still clamoured for a complete cessation of every form of trade with 
Germany - whether the Northern Neutrals were party to this or not - and so 
did Britain’s principal allies. Johnstone had, basing himself on what was said 
during the C.N.H. meeting with Oppenheimer recommended extending the 
list in order to force the Dutch government’s hand, and the 
Oppenheimer/Everwijn scheme seemed to imply that she would be willing 
to duplicate the agreement with the Holland America Line for other items 
on the contraband list. 
 Or was she? On 8 October, Foreign Minister John Loudon signalled 
to De Marees van Swinderen that the scheme had not been discussed with 
the Dutch Foreign Office. Moreover, Loudon mentioned a private 
conversation with Everwijn, in which the latter had claimed that 
Oppenheimer had distorted what had been said at the October 3 meeting in 
his report to his superiors. Finally, Loudon told the London minister that he 
had informed his Cabinet colleague M.W.F. Treub, Everwijn’s superior, that 
‘secret and unauthorized negotiations’ would have a ‘detrimental effect on 
Dutch diplomatic efforts’.48 Presumably, Loudon’s statement was to be 
transmitted to Grey sometime after the 8th. Whether it arrived on the 9th I 
cannot say for certain, but Loudon’s rebuttal of the Oppenheimer/Everwijn 
scheme had no effect on the draft Order in Council the British submitted 
for the American’s approval on that day. This draft not only extended the 
contraband lists, but also added an article indicating the British intention to 
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stop shipments ‘to order’ of the shipper. This meant that it would detain 
any goods of which the shipper had reserved the right to himself to dispose 
of after they had arrived at their port of destination. As regards to the 
Netherlands, this meant that a shipper could no longer unload his goods 
anywhere on the Rhine: he needed to stipulate precisely the ultimate 
destination of his merchandise. Finally, the British government stated that 
she would repeal Article 35 of the Declaration of London (which stipulated 
that the destination as written in the ship's bill of lading would be 
conclusive proof as to its destination) whenever she was convinced that a 
shipper was being deceitful as to said ultimate destination.49 
 The draft Order underway to Washington, Grey instructed Johnstone 
and Oppenheimer to acknowledge the ‘independent nature’ of the Everwijn 
scheme, whilst stating casually that, government-backed or not, Britain quite 
liked it. Their reply prompted a response from Loudon, repeating previous 
statements that the Dutch Government could not comply due to her 
neutrality.50 However, five days later, on 21 October, the Dutch informed 
Oppenheimer that copper and petroleum, both conditional contraband, 
could be consigned to the Netherlands Government51; Everwijn-scheme or 
not, the Dutch had, once again, expanded the number of ‘home-
consumption’ guaranteed goods. 
 Meanwhile, within the US State Department, Robert Lansing had not 
yet given up on his attempts to get the British to accept the Declaration of 
London. In doing so, however, it became increasingly clear that he did not 
have the best interests of fellow neutrals at heart. Upon receiving the draft 
Order in Council on 9 October, Lansing drafted a new reply, sent to the 
American ambassador Page on 16 October. Here, he repeated his October 
2 proposal that Britain would accept the Declaration and use it to extend 
the absolute contraband list. To sweeten the deal, he suggested that an 
Order in Council accepting the Declaration be followed immediately by 
another, in which the British government would declare that if she felt 
convinced that a neutral country, or a port therein, was being used as ‘a base 
of enemy supplies’ (the allusion to Rotterdam is almost palatable), she 
would issue a proclamation that said port or territory had ‘acquired enemy 
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character’ and would be treated subject to the rules of trade with enemy 
territory proper.52 
 Upon receiving the note, Grey replied to Page that he thought 
nothing of the proposal. It seemed to him that first accepting the 
Declaration and then proclaiming an Order in Council to get around it 
served no purpose whatsoever. The following day, 19 October, Page sent 
word to president Wilson directly (perhaps hoping to prevent Lansing from 
making another attempt) that Grey would ‘under no circumstances’ accept 
the Declaration as it stood. His words had almost immediate effect: two 
days later, Spring-Rice could report London of Lansing’s assurance that the 
US would no longer press the issue, a statement affirmed by Page on 23 
October. The Foreign Secretary immediately circulated this information 
within the cabinet as evidence that no serious American objection need be 
feared, thus clearing the way for issuance of the new Order in Council.53 
 Thus, throughout October, the Dutch faced increasing British 
pressure. Ships were still being detained, the contraband lists grew ever 
longer. As we have seen, the Dutch had forbidden the re-exportation of a 
growing number of goods, but they could not continue to do so indefinitely: 
German ire over the loss of her Luftröhre might have very unfortunate 
consequences. Yet this was precisely what the British demanded. Luckily, a 
solution was eventually found, which could, for the moment, satisfy both 
camps. Two mutually exclusive accounts exist of how this solution was 
arrived at, both of which will be detailed in the next section. 
 
 
The N.O.T. in perspective, November 1914 
 
In 1935, Charlotte van Manen published a six-volume set detailing the 
history of the N.O.T. Devoting only a few lines to the subject of its 
founding, she states that it was ‘borne out of necessity’, that the idea had 
‘lingered in the air from the beginning of the war’ and had ‘formed in 
multiple minds at once’, although it was Kröller, the grain merchant, who 
expressed what those ‘multiple minds’ were thinking.54 Although this is of 
course perfectly possible, if slightly ethereal, it has a very limited explanatory 
power in the context of the events described in this article.  
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  A second account of the N.O.T.’s founding, offered in 
Oppenheimer’s autobiography, Stranger Within, focuses on a meeting of the 
Commission for Dutch Trade on 23 October, Oppenheimer had, so he tells 
us, once again been asked to sit in. In Stranger Within, Oppenheimer 
describes the meeting as having a somewhat tempestuous opening: the 
members of the Committee once more complained to him about the large 
number of ships the British were detaining. If Stranger Within is to be 
believed, the Committee’s chairman, Van Aalst, described by Oppenheimer 
as a ‘dominant yet withal emotional personality’ then continued, red hot 
with rage, to state the honourable intentions of the Dutch government and 
Dutch merchants, and contrasted this sharply to the treatment they had 
received from the British. Oppenheimer responded by stating, rather 
emphatically, that he was ‘here to help’. He went on to make a suggestion to 
end the Commission’s troubles:  
 
Your government has appointed your Committee to assist your 
countrymen because you represent what is best in the industrial life 
of this country. As such you enjoy the confidence of your 
Government. I see no reason why His Majesty’s Government should 
not share in this confidence. As moreover you are convinced, as your 
Chairman has stressed, of the integrity of the Dutch commercial 
community as a whole, there appears to be a simple solution to the 
prevailing difficulties: Is your Committee willing to accept on behalf 
of the Dutch consignees the delivery of those goods which are the 
subject of the prevailing difficulties, and thus guarantee their home 
consumption? 55 
 
Van Aalst did not seem to care much for the idea, states Oppenheimer, but 
Joost van Vollenhoven did, and eventually succeeded in bringing the rest of 
the Committee around. 
 I have two main problems with Oppenheimer’s reading of this 
meeting. Firstly, if Oppenheimer was truthful about the meeting in his 
autobiography, it would not be the first, but the second time he asked the 
Committee whether they would guarantee home consumption. During an 
earlier meeting with the C.N.H., on 25 September, he had also inquired into 
the matter, and had learned that the Committee would not be willing to 
accept such a responsibility. In his report on the meeting, he described the 
mood of the Committee as ‘unanimous’ in that regard. Did Van 
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Vollenhoven change his mind? During the October 23 meeting, the third 
Order in Council had not yet been issued: had things gotten that desperate 
between 25 September and this supposedly faithful meeting? 
 The second problem concerns overall British policy versus the 
neutrals as it stood in September and October 1914. As I have made clear, it 
was Britain’s policy to get the Northern Neutral governments to take action 
themselves to stop exports to Germany, enticing them to do so by 
extending the contraband lists, detaining ships and halting imports of 
certain vital supplies unless guarantees were obtained. As we have seen, 
these actions were, in the case of the Netherlands, not without a certain 
degree of success: the lists of products banned from re-exportation by the 
Dutch government had grown considerably since the Order in Council of 
20 August, although she still refused to guarantee home consumption for all 
goods the Entente considered conditional contraband. 
 And British pressure was to be turned up a notch. Now that the US 
State Department had acquiesced in British adaptation of the Declaration of 
London, the Foreign Office was ready to complete a final draft of the new 
Order in Council. It differed very little from the one sent to Lansing on 9 
October. The final version, published 29 October, included even more 
items on the contraband list, and added a clause that a neutral ship guilty of 
carrying contraband to an enemy port under false papers was made liable to 
capture up to the end of its voyage. The provision regarding goods 
consigned ‘to order’ remained the same, but the presumption was stated to 
be refutable; the burden of proof was put upon the claimants in a prize 
court.56 A mere two days later, the Dutch government issued a statement 
informing merchants that a ship’s bill of lading would have to include the 
final destination of the shipment. Before the October 29 Order in Council, 
she had been unwilling to do so, stating that doing so would entail a serious 
violation of the Rhine Shipping Act. The Order, however, gave her little 
choice.57 
 On 1 November the under-Secretary of State, Sir Eyre Crowe, 
submitted a lengthy memorandum on British policy regarding the shipment 
of contraband to neutrals. This memorandum called for the negotiation of 
‘contraband’ agreements with all neutral European powers. By getting the 
Northern Neutrals to prevent the passage of strategic materials through 
their ports into Germany, the British could ensure that American trade with 
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the European neutrals would be comparable to pre-war levels without 
threatening the integrity of their maritime controls.58 This memorandum 
and the Order in Council, drafted in part to include Lansing’s and Spring 
Rice’s suggestions on solving the British problems by pressuring the 
Northern Neutrals to comply with British demands, are the clearest 
indication of the direction of British policy regarding economic warfare in 
this phase of the First World War. Why would Oppenheimer deviate from 
official policy, especially after his report on the September 25th meeting, 
where he seemed to support pressuring the Dutch government?  
 
 
The Executive Board of the N.O.T., 1922-1924, by Antoon van Welie. Rijksmuseum, 
Amsterdam. 
 
 In keeping with official British policy, Johnstone submitted, on 2 
November, a note to Loudon stating that, pending ‘some definite 
agreement’ cereals, rice, flour and meat en route to Holland would be 
detained, unless a guarantee as to their ultimate destination could be given.59 
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 Eight days later, on 10 November, the C.N.H. held a meeting in The 
Hague, possibly to discuss the implications of the October 29 Order in 
Council. Apart from the regular C.N.H.-members, representatives from the 
seven largest Dutch shipping companies were present, probably in 
connection with Britain declaring the whole of the North Sea a war zone on 
2 November, which obviously increased the danger to neutral trade. During 
this meeting, a possible solution to the Dutch quagmire was put forward.60 
This solution entailed getting Dutch merchants and shipping companies to 
form a trust. This trust, which was dubbed the Nederlandsche Overzee 
Trustmaatschappij (Netherlands Oversea Trustcompany) could give the 
British exactly the guarantees they wanted: merchants and shipping 
companies alike would only be able to become a member of this trust if 
they solemnly promised that their goods were meant for use in Holland. As 
a private company, the trust need not be bound by the same strictures as 
the Dutch government; and it could guarantee home consumption without 
violating international treaties. Agreement amongst all those present was 
reached the same day, and work began on drafting two types of contracts 
for potential members of this trust, one for shipping companies and one for 
merchants.61 
 Four days after the N.O.T. had been founded, Van Vollenhoven 
brought Oppenheimer up to speed.62 He no doubt informed Johnstone, 
busy drafting an explanatory memorandum to the Dutch Government, who 
had, on 13 November, responded even more vehemently than usual to his 
November 2 note. Responding to Johnstone’s reference to pending 
negotiations, Foreign Minister John Loudon had, noting Britain was in 
obvious violation of the ‘Droit des Gens’, declared an ‘ouverture éventuelle 
de négociations’ concerning a Government guarantee for the ultimate 
destination of contraband goods to be contrary to her neutrality.63 
 Perhaps the British legation was convinced by the harsh tone of 
Loudon’s reply, of the futility in trying to make the Dutch government 
guarantee home consumption of all contraband goods. Perhaps 
Oppenheimer and Johnstone had been convinced by Van Vollenhoven of 
the usefulness of the N.O.T. project to their cause. In any case, the British 
response acknowledged the Trust in a serious way. It started conventionally 
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enough, with the British Government proposing, as it had done earlier, that 
the Dutch Government be prepared to guarantee home consumption for 
imports into the Netherlands branded as such by the Order in Council of 
29 October. However, it continued by stating that the British Government 
was ‘prepared to accept, in a form still to be agreed, the guarantee of the 
The Hague Trading Committee as to their home consumption, provided 
that such guarantee forms part of the bill of lading accompanying these 
goods; provided also that under the arrangement to be made with the 
committee the shipping lines and owners of tramp steamers, still to be 
specified, bind themselves to carry [no contraband, conditional or 
otherwise] under the guarantee of the committee as to their home 
consumption.’64 
 In his reply to Johnstone’s memorandum, Loudon seemed to agree 
with him that consigning goods to the N.O.T. would be a considerable step 
towards securing home consumption without there being a need for the 
Dutch government to break any legal obligations. When both the British 
and the Dutch governments, independently of each other of course, had 
acknowledged the N.O.T. as a forum for settling the outstanding dispute 
concerning contraband, detailed negotiations could begin to iron out the 
precise way in which the N.O.T. would guarantee that conditional 
contraband would not be re-exported. Certainly, the British government still 
required certain goods to be consigned to her Dutch counterpart, but since 
the Dutch already allowed for these (mostly foodstuffs and fuels) to be 
consigned to her, there were no resulting difficulties. Negotiations were 
wrapped up on 29 December, and the N.O.T. signed its first contract on 11 
January the following year.65 
 This agreement, however, was not to last. Events in 1915, such as the 
unrestricted submarine warfare and Britain’s retaliatory measures, stating 
that she would do away with all ‘judicial niceties’ and deprive Germany of 
all imports, irrespective of their origin66, would have a profound impact on 
the N.O.T.. It would, nevertheless, play a pivotal role in both Anglo-Dutch 
relations and the Entente economical war effort until the end of the war. 
 Interestingly, German reaction to the founding of the N.O.T., and 
the accompanying potentially devastating effects on her war economy, came 
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relatively late in the game. Sure, the ever-increasing British pressure did not 
go unnoticed amongst government circles. At the end of 1914, Reich 
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg stated, reacting to renewed 
British pressuring to incite the Dutch to close the N.O.T. deal, that the 
Luftröhre was snapped shut, since Dutch harbours were ipso facto closed 
due to the British measures.67 
 It took until the second half of 1915(!) before the Germans gradually 
came to understand the danger. The tardiness of their response has raised 
many eyebrows but can be explained. For one, the N.O.T. was acutely 
aware of the danger of German reprisals, and founded, in May 1915, a 
specific subcommittee designed for German contraband, thereby 
perpetuating the fiction that the N.O.T. worked for both sides. Secondly, 
reports on the N.O.T. by German agents in the Netherlands were few and 
far between. Felix von Müller, chief German envoy to the Netherlands, only 
very rarely send newspaper reports home, from which she could have 
learned quite a lot about the workings of the N.O.T. Thirdly, and perhaps 
more importantly, the introduction of the N.O.T. did not (at least not 
initially) result in a drop of Dutch exports to Germany. Certain goods, for 
example tea and coffee, were considered free under the N.O.T. agreement, 
and could thus be re-exported to the Central Powers. Moreover, indigenous 
Dutch products, especially those agricultural in nature, continued to find a 
ready market in Germany. Only from 1916 onwards, when the Entente 
introduced a system under which the neutrals were only allowed to import 
their pre-war quantity and thus cut any excess (contraband or other) ready 
for re-exportation, export from Holland gradually ground to a halt.68 
 From November 1914 until February 1917, when the American 
entrance into the war tightened the blockade and spelled the end of 
‘symmetrical neutrality’, the NOT, made responsible for keeping the peace 
with the Entente, usurped more and more of the Dutch government’s 
powers in the diplomatic and economic field. She operated semi-
autonomously, and her position was often likened to that of a ‘state within 
the state’. The story of its origin gives us some tantalising details on the 
impact and direction of the forces the Trust enacted upon the two 
competing power blocs and the Dutch government (and vice-versa) and 
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how all of this impacted on the concept and workings of Dutch neutrality 
and the Dutch economy. Answers to the many questions as to the how and 
why of the Trust’s functioning and its impact on the concept of Dutch 
neutrality (one wonders if this term can still be realistically used to describe 
the Dutch role, especially when it comes to its role in the Entente economic 
warfare) are, however, far and few. Detailed research on the copiously 
available archival material it has left behind is key to answering some of 
those questions, and thereby gaining a more complete picture of both the 
history of Dutch neutrality during the First World War, the history of the 
Entente blockade in general and the history of the relationship between 
neutrals and belligerents during that war. 
